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WHEN LENDERS CAN LEGALLY PROVIDE LOANS WITH 
EFFECTIVE ANNUAL INTEREST RATES ABOVE 1,000 
PERCENT, IS IT TIME FOR CONGRESS TO CONSIDER A 
FEDERAL INTEREST CAP ON CONSUMER LOANS? 
Victor D. López* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The question of whether interest rates should be regulated for the good of soci-
ety has been debated by secular and religious authorities for millennia. Plato advo-
cated a complete bar on charging interest, writing that “no one shall deposit money 
with another whom he does not trust as a friend, nor shall he lend money upon inter-
est; and the borrower should be under no obligation to repay either capital or inter-
est.”1 Aristotle echoed his teacher’s sentiments, writing in his Politics: 
[F]or usury is most reasonably detested, as it is increasing our fortune by 
money itself, and not employing it for the purpose it was originally in-
tended, namely exchange.  
And this is the explanation of the name (TOKOS), which means the breed-
ing of money. For as offspring resemble their parents, so usury is money 
bred of money. Whence of all forms of money-making it is most against 
nature.2  
Proscriptions against usury and money lending generally can also be found 
rooted in religious traditions, including those of the Jewish, Christian and Muslim 
faiths. Jews were forbidden to charge interest on loans to other Jews under Biblical 
Law3 and under Talmudic Law.4 Christians were likewise forbidden from charging 
interest on loans through the Middle Ages both by the prohibitions found on the Old 
Testament and by various Canons of the Catholic Church.5 For Muslims, ribā, or 
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 1.  PLATO, LAWS, bk V, at 109 (Benjamin Jowett trans.)(348 B.C.). 
 2.  ARISTOTLE, POLITICS: A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT,, Book I, Chapter X (A.M. William Ellis 
trans.,George Routledge and Sons 1985)(350 B.C.). 
 3.  20 HAIM HERMANN COHN AND BEN-ZION ELIASH, Usury, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 437 (Michael 
Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
 4.  Id. at 438-440. 
 5.  See 14 T.F. DIVINE, Usury, in NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 353-54 (2d ed. 2003). 
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usury, is prohibited by the Qurʾān.6 It was not until the Statute of Usury of 15457 
during the Reformation in England that interest at a rate of less than ten percent could 
be imposed without penalty.8 This and subsequent usury statutes did not make it legal 
to charge interest, but they removed any punishment for charging rates less 
than the statutory maximum.9 By 1886, the United States stood as a nation built 
upon strong usury laws, with each state having its own regulations.10 But problems 
developed that required states to create exceptions to the usury laws, and within dec-
ades, usury laws varied widely from state to state.11 
 In the United States today, usury can be defined as “[a] bargain under 
which a greater profit than is permitted by law is paid, or is agreed to 
be paid to a creditor by or on behalf of the debtor for a loan of money, 
or for extending the maturity of a pecuniary debt, is usurious and il-
legal.”12 Restrictions on the highest rate of interest allowed by law (if 
any) are generally set by the states. In 2007, Congress placed an interest rate 
cap of 36 percent13 on covered members of the armed forces and their dependents.14 
The regulation applies to members of the armed forces on active duty and those on 
active guard and reserve duty15 and to their covered dependents.16 Congress has not, 
however, opted to place any interest caps on the interest that may be agreed to in 
contracts involving non-military personnel for whom only restrictions set by the 
states of their domicile apply. Whether and to what extent citizens are protected 
against unreasonably high interest rates, therefore, is a matter for state legislatures to 
decide.  
II. STATE RESTRICTIONS ON USURY 
Almost all states today restrict the maximum rate of interest that may be charged 
to a borrower by a creditor with the maximum rate often varying depending on the 
type of borrower involved, the amount borrowed and the purpose of the loan with 
wide-ranging differences among the states as to the maximum interest rate applicable 
 
 6.  7 FAZLUR RAHMAN,Islam: An Overview [First Edition] in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 4574 (Lind-
say Jones ed. 2d ed. 2005). 
 7.  Act Against Usury 1545, 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (Eng.). 
 8.  Kevin M. Teeven, A History of Legislative Reform of the Common Law of Contract, 26 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 35, 45 (1994). 
 9.  Id. at 45, n.67. 
 10.  Steven Mercatante, The Deregulation of Usury Ceilings, Rise of Easy Credit, and Increasing Con-
sumer Debt, 53 S.D. L. REV. 37, 39 (2008)(referencing James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A 
History of Usury, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 61 at 85 (1981)). 
 11.  Id. (referencing James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of Usury, 1981 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 61, 108 (1981)). 
 12.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 526 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
 13.  10 U.S.C.A. § 987(b) (West 2015). 
 14.  10 U.S.C.A. § 987(a) (West 2015). 
 15.  10 U.S.C.A. § 987(i)(1)(A)-(B) (West 2015). 
 16.  10 U.S.C.A. § 987(i)(2) (West 2015). This section defines a covered dependent as those defined under 
10 U.S.C.A. § 1072 (A), (D), (E), and (I) namely a spouse, dependent child under 21 (or 23 if in college or any 
age if disabled) and an unmarried person placed under the legal custody of the military member by a court of 
competent jurisdiction and who has been in that member’s custody for 12 months. (The same age restrictions 
as for a child apply.) 
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to a variety of loans as Table 1 illustrates. The consequences of entering into usurious 
loans can also vary widely with respect to criminal and civil penalties. For purposes 
of ease of comparison, Table 1 contains a compilation of the maximum interest rate 
allowable in the 50 states and in the District of Columbia. The table also notes the 
civil penalties for creditors who make usurious loans. (The criminal penalties for 
usury, where applicable, are not are not referenced in the table. 
 
Table 1: Maximum Allowable Interest Rate by State 
State Maximum Allowable Annual In-
terest Rate 
Effect of Usurious 
Contract 
Alabama 6 percent on oral contracts and 8 per-
cent on written contracts
17
  
Loans or credit sales up to $2,000 may 
not exceed a 6 percent.
18
 In the alter-
native, creditors may charge a maxi-
mum of 2 percent above the prime rate 
for credit sales.
19
 Revolving credit ar-
rangements may carry a maximum 
monthly interest rate of 1.75 percent 
for the first $750 and 1.5 percent for 










For loan amounts of up to $25,000 the 
maximum interest that may be charged   
 
is the greater of 10 percent or 5 points 
above the rate charged member banks 
for advances by the 12th Federal Re-
serve District on the day on which the 










 17.  ALA. CODE § 8-8-1 (1975). For loans made by savings and loan institutions in the state and secured 
by a savings account, the maximum yearly rate of interest is limited to 2 percent above the interest paid by the 
institution to the depositor on the secured account ALA. CODE § 8-8-1.2 (1975). Interest on loans of $2,000 or 
more, however, are not subject to a usury defense ALA. CODE § 8-8-5 (1975). Numerous exceptions are provided 
under Alabama law for charging higher rates of interest by, among others, certain public hospital corporations 
ALA. CODE § 22-21-6 (1975), certain municipal bonds ALA. CODE § 11-20-5 (1975), Water Pollution Control 
Authority securities ALA. CODE § 22-34-14 (1975), and notes, bonds or other securities issued by the State or 
any instrumentality thereof ALA. CODE § 8-8-7 (1975). 
 18.  ALA. CODE § 11-20-48(a)(1975). 
 19.  ALA. CODE § 8-8-14(b)(1975) (prime rate is the average prime rate of the three largest banks in New 
York City three days prior to the sale). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  ALA. CODE § 8-8-12 (1975) Usury cannot be pleaded as a defense against a holder in due course of a 
negotiable instrument. ALA. CODE § 8-8-12(b) (1975). 
 22.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(a) (2015). 
 23.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010 (b) (2015). 
 24.  ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.040 (2015). 
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Arizona 10 percent for oral agreements
25
   



















10 percent if agreed to in writing in 




The greater of 10 percent or 5 points 
above the prime rate established by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran-




Treble the amount of the 








Contract void as to usu-
rious interest (usurious 










Delaware 5 points above the Federal Reserve 
discount rate.
38
 No limit on leans in 





Usurious portion of in-





 25.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 44-1201 (2011). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 44-1202 (2011). 
 28.  ARK. CONST. amend. 89, § 3. There is no maximum rate of interest that applies to loans made to or by 
governmental units in the state or to bonds issued by governmental units absent rules to the contrary being 
established by the General Assembly (ARK. CONST. amend. 89, § 1 (3)). 
 29.  The forfeiting of interest is not specifically addressed in ARK. CONST. amend. 89. Article 19, Section 
13 of the Arkansas Constitution provided that all loans that are usurious “shall be void as to the unpaid interest” 
and that the borrower is entitled to “twice the amount of interest paid.” See Smith v. Eisen, 245 S.W. 3d 160, 
167 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006). However, ARK. CONST. amend. 89, § 14 has repealed Article 19, Section 13. 
 30.  CAL. CONST. Art. 15, § 1, Sec. 1 (West 2015). 
 31.  CAL. CONST. Art. 15, § 1, Sec. 1(1) (West 2015). 
 32.  CAL. CONST. Art. 15, § 1, Sec. 1(2) (West 2015). 
 33.  CAL. UNCOD INIT MEASURES AND STATS 1919 -1§3(a) (Deering 1919). 
 34.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-12-103 (1) (2012). (If interest is unspecified in a contract or if an oral agreement 
is involved, the rate of interest would be 8 percent under COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-12-101.) 
 35.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-5-201 (2) (2012). (Any amount paid in excess of the maximum interest allowed 
by law is recoverable by the debtor and punitive damages may be awarded under COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-5-201 
(3).) 
 36.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 37-4 (West 2015). 
 37.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 37-8 (West 2015). 
 38.  DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6 § 2301(a) (2015). 
 39.  DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6 § 2301(c) (2015). 
 40.  DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6 § 2304 (2015) (stating that the greater or treble damages or $500 are awardable 
to the debtor if the entire usurious interest has been paid). 
2016] Journal of Legislation 39 
Florida 18 for loans up to $500,000. No maxi-







Georgia 7 percent absent a written contract
43
 
16 percent in loans with a written con-








Hawaii 10 percent absent a written agreement 
with a different rate
46
 
12 percent maximum rate for written 




24 percent for financial institutions 
regulated by chapter 412 [Code of Fi-
nancial Institutions] other than credit 








Idaho 12 percent absent a written agreement 
specifying a different rate
50
 






Illinois 9 percent for written contracts
52
 








Debtor may recover an 
amount equal to twice 
the entire interest, dis-
count and charges due 
on the loan or paid by 







The maximum rate for revolving loans 
and other supervised loans
57
 can be ei-
ther of the following two options: 
Interest payable is the 
maximum interest al-
lowed by law. The usuri-
 
 41.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.03(1) (West 2015). 
 42.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.04 (West 2015). 
 43.  GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2(a)(1)(A) (2015). 
 44.  GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2(a)(2) (2015). 
 45.  GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-10 (2015). 
 46.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 478-2 (West 2015). 
 47.  HAW. REV. STAT.  § 478-4(a) (West 2015). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  HAW. REV. STAT.  § 478-5 (West 2015). 
 50.  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-22-104 (West 2015). 
 51.  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-42-201(1) (West 2015). 
 52.  815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/4(1) (West 2015). 
 53.  815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/28 (West 2015). 
 54.  815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/4.2 (West 2015). 
 55.  815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/6 (West 2015). 
 56.  IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-201 (West 2015). 
 57.  IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4-5-3-501(1) (West 2015) (a supervised loan is a consumer loan with an interest 
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Option 1: 




21 percent on the unpaid balance that 













ous portion of the inter-
est is unenforceable and, 




Iowa 5 percent contracts not expressed in a 
writing or when interest is not stated
63
 
No maximum interest rate as to written 
contracts involving real estate, loans 
for business and agricultural purposes, 
and some loans for personal, family or 
household purposes  for real estate ex-




21 percent for consumer credit sales 
not involving open-end credit
65
 





Interest is forfeit and an 
8 percent penalty on the 
remaining unpaid princi-




Kansas 10 percent in the absence of agreement 





 (not applicable 
to business or agricultural loans
70
) 
No limit on open end consumer loans 




36 percent on the portion of the unpaid 
balance which is $860 or less, and 21 
Interest above permitted 
rate is forfeit (an addi-
tional amount equal to 
the excess interest and 
reasonable attorney’s 
fees may also be recov-
ered in a counterclaim 
by the debtor in any ac-
tion by the creditor to 
 
rate of 25% or more). 
 58.  IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-508(2)(a)(i) (West 2015). 
 59.  IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-508(2)(a)(ii) (West 2015). 
 60.  IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-508(2)(a)(iii) (West 2015). 
 61.  IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-508(2)(b) (West 2015). 
 62.  IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-5-202(3) (West 2015). 
 63.  IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.2(1)(a)-(g) (West 2015). 
 64.  IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.2(2) (West 2015). See also 12 C.F.R. § 1026.3 (2015). 
 65.  IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.2202(1) (West 2015). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.2201(2) (West 2015). 
 68.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-201 (2015). 
 69.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-207(a) (2015). 
 70.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-207(e) (2015). 
 71.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-401(1) (2015). 
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percent on the portion of the unpaid 
balance which exceeds $860
72
  
18 percent for consumer loans secured 








Kentucky 8 percent absent a writing
75
 
4 percent above the Federal Reserve 
bank discount rate for written loans up 








Entire interest is forfeit. 
If usurious interest has 
been paid, twice the 
amount of the interest 

















Maine For consumer credit sales other than 
open-end credit interest may not ex-




30 percent of unpaid balance up to 
$1,000 and  
21 percent on amounts greater than 
$1,000 up to $2,800 and 
















Debtor need not pay the 
portion of the interest 
that is higher than that 
allowed by law.
87
 If the 
interest has been paid, 
the usurious portion of 
the interest may be re-




 72.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-401(2) (2015). 
 73.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-401(3)-(4) (2015). 
 74.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-207(d) (2015). 
 75.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 360.010(1) (West 2015). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 360.020(1) (West 2015). 
 79.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3500(C)(1) (2015). 
 80.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3500(D) (2015). 
 81.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3501 (2015). 
 82.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9 § 2-201(2)(B) (2015). 
 83.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9 § 2-201(2)(A) (2015). 
 84.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9  § 2-402(4) (2015). 
 85.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9 § 2-402(5) (2015). 
 86.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9 § 2-601 (2015). 
 87.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 9 § 5-201(3) (2015). 
 88.  Id. 
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Loans secured by a borrower’s certifi-
cate of deposit may carry an interest 2 




24 percent for loans secured by collat-
eral other than a savings account and 
for certain unsecured loans.
91
 
No maximum rate on some loans se-





Forfeit the greater of 
three times the amount 
of interest and charges 
above those authorized 
by law or $500.
93
 
Massachusetts 6 percent if there is no written agree-
ment to the contrary.
94
 













 In other agree-
ments, excess interest 







7 percent if evidenced by a writing.
100
 












8 percent if evidenced by a writing.
104
 




Usurious contracts are 
void.
107
 Excess interest 





 89.  MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-103(a)(1) (West 2015). 
 90.  MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-103(a)(2) (West 2015). 
 91.  MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-103(a)(3) (West 2015). 
 92.  MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-103(b)(1) (West 2015). 
 93.  MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-114(a)(1) (West 2015). 
 94.  MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 107, § 3 (LexisNexis 2015). 
 95.  MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 271, § 49 (LexisNexis 2015). 
 96.  MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 255D, § 11(B) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 97.  MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 255D, § 29(A) (LExisNexis 2015). 
 98.  MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 140, § 106 (LexisNexis 2015). 
 99.  MICH. COM. LAWS SERV. § 438.31 (LexisNexis 2015). 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  MICH. COM. LAWS SERV. § 450.1275 (LexisNexis 2015). 
 102.  MICH. COM. LAWS SERV. § 438.32 (LexisNexis 2015). 
 103.  MINN. STAT. § 334.01 (subdiv. 2) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.01 (subdiv. 3) (West 2015). 
 107.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.03 (West 2015). 
 108.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.02 (West 2015). 
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4.5 percent above the discount rate on 
90-day commercial paper Federal re-
serve rate for the District encompass-
ing Minnesota when business or agri-







For written agreements, the greater of 
10 percent or 5 percent above discount 
rate on 90-day commercial paper of 
the Federal Reserve bank in the Fed-




For partnerships, religious organiza-
tions and for-profit and not-for-profit 
entities, the greater of 15 percent or 5 
percent above discount rate on 90-day 
commercial paper of the Federal Re-
serve bank in the Federal Reserve dis-
trict where the lender is located for 




Forfeiture provision for 
entire interest only 
available if lender exe-
cutes evidence of debt in 
a note or contract  pur-
porting to have a rate of 
interest not greater than 
6 percent but actually 





remedies are not pro-
vided by statute.  
Missouri 10 percent (written agreement re-
quired) or 3 points above the index of 
long-term U.S. Government Bonds, 
whichever is higher.
113
  Banks, trust 
companies and savings and loans asso-
ciations can purchase any note, bill of 
exchange, or other evidence of debt at 




Twice the amount of in-
terest paid above the le-
gal rate is recoverable by 
the debtor along with 




Montana 15 percent or an amount that is 6 per-
centage points per year above the 
prime rate published by the Federal 
Reserve system in its statistical release 
H.15 Selected Interest Rates for bank 
prime loans dated 3 business days 




Forfeiture of a sum dou-
ble the amount of inter-
est that the note, bill, or 
other evidence of debt 
carries or that has been 
agreed to be paid on the 





 106.  MINN. STAT. ANN, § 334.011 (subdiv. 1) (West 2015). Section 334.011, subdivision 2 of the Minne-
sota Code requires all interest to be forfeit for such loans and allows twice the amount of the usurious interest 
paid. MINN. STAT. § 334.01 (subdiv. 2)(West 2015). 
 109.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-17-1(1) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 110.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-17-1(2) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 111.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-17-1(3) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 112.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-17-3 ( LexisNexis 2015). 
 113.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 408.030(1) (West 2015). 
 114.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 408.030(4) (West 2015). 
 115.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 408.030(2) (West 2015). 
 116.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-107(1) (2015). 
 117.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-108(1) (2015). 





All interest is forfeit.
119
 













New Jersey 6 percent absent a written contract.
122
 






New Mexico 15 percent absent a written contract.
124
 
15 percent on current or open accounts 




No limit to loans to corporations.
126
 
No limit to business or commercial 




Forfeiture of interest in 




New York 16 percent.
129
 
No limit on loans of $250,000 or more 








Usury defense not available to corpo-











For loans of up to $15,000 payable in 
not less than 12 months nor more than 
96 months and not secured by a mort-
gages on real property or deeds of 
Forfeiture of entire in-
terest.
139
 If usurious in-
terest has been paid by 
the debtor, an action 
 
 118.  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-101.03(1) (West 2015). 
 119.  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-105 (West 2015). 
 120.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 99.050 (West 2015). 
 121.  N.H. REV. STAT. § 336:1(I) (2015). 
 122.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 31:1-1(a) (West 2015). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-3 (2015). 
 125.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-5 (2015). 
 126.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-9(B) (2015). 
 127.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-9(C) (2015). 
 128.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-13 (2015). 
 129.  N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-a(1) (McKinney 2015). 
 130.  N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(6)(a) (McKinney 2015). 
 131.  N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(6)(b) (McKinney 2015). 
 132.  N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511(1) (McKinney 2015). 
 133.  N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521(1) (McKinney 2015). 
 139.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-2 (West 2015). 
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trust, the maximum interest is as fol-
lows: 
30 percent on the first $4,000, 24 per-
cent on amounts more than $4,000 up 
to $8,000, and 
18 percent on amounts in excess of 
$8,000 up to $10,000. 
134
 
18 percent on loans for amounts 




18 percent for revolving credit loans. 
136
 




For loans other than open-ended loans 
of up to $25,000 the maximum interest 
is as follows: 
The greater of 16 percent or 6 points 





may be brought to re-
cover twice the amount 
of the interest paid.
140
 
North Dakota 5.5 percent above the average of U.S. 




Limit does not apply to corporations, 
limited liability companies, coopera-
tive corporations or associations or 
trusts.
142
 The limit also does not apply 
to partnerships, limited partnerships, 
or associations that file a state or fed-




Forfeiture of the entire 




usurious interest has 
been paid, twice the 
amount of interest paid 
is recoverable by the 
debtor along with 25 







For retail sales contracts, the greater of 
8 percent for balances of $750 or less 
plus a finance charge of $0.50 for the 
first $50 and $0.25 for each additional 
Forfeiture of interest 





 134.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-176(a)(1) (West 2015). 
 135.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-176(a)(2) (West 2015). 
 136.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-11(a) (West 2015). 
 137.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-1.1(a)(2) (West 2015). 
 138.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-1.1(c) (West 2015). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-14-09(1) (West 2015). 
 142.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-14-09(2)(b) (West 2015). 
 143.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-14-09(2)(c) (West 2015). 
 144.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-14-10 (West 2015). 
 145.  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-14-10(1) (West 2015). 
 146.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(A) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 153.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1317.061 (LexisNexis 2015). 
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No limit for contracts with registered 
brokers or dealers for debt payable on 




Revolving charge retail sales agree-




No limit on loans evidenced by a de-
mand instrument that is not secured by 
household furnishings or goods used 








Oklahoma 10 percent in the absence of legislation 
providing for a different rate
154
 
10 percent for consumer loans.
155
 





Forfeiture of entire in-
terest; If any usurious in-
terest has been paid, 




Oregon 9 percent in the absence of an agree-
ment for a different rate.
158
 
For loans up to $50,000, the higher or 
12 percent or 5 percent above the aver-
age discount rate for 90-day commer-
cial paper set by the Federal Reserve 









 147.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1317.06(A)(1)-(2) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 148.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 149.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 150.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1317.061 (LexisNexis 2015). 
 151.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(B)(5) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 152.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(B)(6) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 154.  OKLA. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 155.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 3-201(1) (West 2015). 
 156.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 3-605 (West 2015) (referencing § 5-107 (2) as the highest rate allowed 
for non-consumer loans [45 percent as of this writing]). 
 157.  OKLA. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 158.  OR. REV. STAT. § 82.010(1) (West 2015). 
 159.  OR. REV. STAT. § 82.010(3) (West 2015). 
 160.  OR. REV. STAT. § 82.010(4) (West 2015). (But note: certain financial institutions, mortgage lenders, 
and interest charged by broker-dealers are exempt from the usury provisions in O.R.S. § 82.010 (3)-(4) under 
O.R.S. § 82.025 (1)-(8).) 
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Pennsylvania 6 percent for loans up to $50,000.
161
 












2.5 percent above the Monthly Index 
of Long Term United States Govern-




Forfeiture of interest 
above that allowed by 
law.
166
  If excess interest 
has been paid, three 




Costs and reasonable at-
torney’s fees are also re-




Rhode Island The higher of: 
21 percent or 9 percent plus the domes-
tic prime rate as published in the 




No limit on credit card loans.
170
 
No limit on loans to commercial enti-
ties in excess of $1,000,000 not se-
cured by a mortgage against the resi-
dence of any principal borrower.
171
 
Usurious contracts are 
void,
172
 except as to 




  Payments of 
interest and/or principal 
are recoverable by the 
debtor.
174
 If the lenders 
are financial institutions 
and if a usurious con-
tract is knowingly made, 
then all interest is for-
feit.
175
 In such cases, 
twice the amount of any 






6 percent absent a written contract.
177
 




Excess charges beyond 
those allowed by law are 
recoverable.
187
 If excess 
charges are not refunded 
 
 161.  41 PA. CONS. STAT. § 201(a) (2015). 
 162.  41 PA. CONS. STAT. § 201(b) (2015). 
 163.  41 PA. CONS. STAT. § 201(b)(2) (2015). 
 164.  41 PA. CONS. STAT. § 201(b)(3) (2015). 
 165.  41 PA. CONS. STAT. § 301(b) (2015). 
 166.  41 PA. CONS. STAT. §501 (2015). 
 167.  41 PA. CONS. STAT. § 502 (2015). 
 168.  41 PA. CONS. STAT. § 503 (2015). 
 169.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-2(a)-(b) (1956). 
 170.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-2(d) (1956). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26.1-4 (1956) (allowing credit card 
lenders to set interest “at any daily, weekly, monthly, annual or other periodic percentage rate”). 
 171.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-2(e) (1956). 
 172.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-4(a) (1956). 
 173.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-4(b) (1956). 
 174.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-4(c) (1956). 
 175.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-4(d) (1956). 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-10-106(1) (1976). 
 178.  Id. 
 187.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-202(3) (1979). 
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Exception for consumer contracts: 
12 percent for consumer loans with 




For consumer loans with supervised 
lenders rates are as follows for loans 
up to  $7,500: 
Loans up to $150, $2.50 charge per 
month in lieu of interest;
180
 
Loans greater than $150 up to $2,000, 
$25 per $100 borrowed for the first 
$600, $18 per $100 borrowed on 
amounts exceeding $600 up to $1,000, 
and $12 per $100 for amounts exceed-
ing $1,000 up to $2,000.
181
 This slid-
ing scale is based on a 12 month loan 
with allowable interest for loans of 
lesser or greater duration adjusted ac-




tional amount not to exceed the lesser 
of $56 or 7 percent of the amount bor-
rowed may also be charged.
183
 
Loans in excess of $2,000 up to $7,500 
are limited to 9 percent annual interest 
on the entire loan.
184
 An additional 
charge of the lesser of 5 percent of the 
amount borrowed or $200 may also be 
assessed on such loans.
185
 Splitting of 
loans greater than $2,000 into multiple 
loans for the purpose of obtaining a 




on request when a con-
sumer loan is involved, a 
court may impose a pen-
alty of not less than $100 














For bank installment loans: 
Usurious interest above 
the permitted rate may 
be offset as a defense 
 
 179.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-201(1) (1976). 
 180.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140(a)(1) (1976). 
 181.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140(a)(2) (1976). 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140(a)(3) (1976). 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-140(d) (1979). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-3-1.1 (2015). 
 190.  TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 7. 
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11.58 percent on loans greater than six 
months but less than one year.
192
 
12.59 percent for loans of at least 12 
months but less than 24 months.
193
 
13.38 percent for loans of at least 24 
months but less than 36 months.
194
 
14.17 percent for loans of at least 36 
months but less than 48 months.
195
 
15.04 percent for loans of at least 48 
months but less than 60 months.
196
 
16.02 percent for loans of at least 60 
months but less than 72 months.
197
 
17.15 percent for loans at least 72 
months but less than 84 months.
198
 





against creditor in an ac-








Consumer loans that are not secured 
by real property may carry maximum 
interest rates as follows: 
30 percent up to $500.
202
 
24 percent on amounts greater than 
$500 up to $1,050.
203
 
18 percent on amounts greater than 




Creditors are liable to 
obligors for three times 
the difference between 
the usurious contract 
rate and the maximum 
interest allowed by law 
or, in the alternative, the 
lesser of 20 percent of 





 191.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(i) (2015). 
 192.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(ii) (2015). 
 193.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(iii) (2015). 
 194.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(iv) (2015). 
 195.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(v) (2015). 
 196.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(vi) (2015). 
 197.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(vii) (2015). 
 198.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(viii) (2015). 
 199.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1106(1)(A)(ix) (2015). 
 200.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-110. See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-115(a) (2015) (giving Chancery 
Court concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law for the abatement and recovery of usurious charges beyond 
those allowed by law). 
 201.  TEX. CONST. ART. 16, § 11. 
 202.  TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.201(e)(1) (West 2015). Note that dollar amounts are indexed per 
V.T.C.A., Finance Code § 341 Subchapter C yearly based on the Consumer Price Index. 
 203.  TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.201(e)(2) (West 2015). 
 204.  TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.201(e)(3) (West 2015). 
 205.  TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.001(a)(1)-(2) (West 2015). 
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Utah Parties may agree to any rate.
206
 If no 
rate is agreed to, then the interest de-





Vermont 12 percent generally
208
 
18 percent for single payment loans by 
lenders regulated by Title 8 and federal 
savings and loan associations.
209
 
18 percent for the first $500.00 and 15 
percent for the balance in excess of 




No limit for bank credit cards.
211
 
18 percent for loans secured by new 
vehicles and 20 percent for loans se-
cured by vehicles older than the cur-
rent or previous model year.
212
 
24 percent on the first $1000.00 and 12 
percent on the balance in excess of 
$1000.00; or 18 percent annual per-
centage rate on the aggregate balance 
outstanding whichever is higher for in-




18 percent for loans secured by subor-
dinate liens on real estate.
214
 






ingly enter into usurious 
contracts forfeit all in-




 If usurious 
interest is paid by a 
debtor, however, only 
the amount of the inter-
est above the permissi-
ble rate is recoverable 
along with interest 




Virginia 12 percent generally.
218
 
No limit on bank installment loans.
219
 
Consumer finance companies may 
charge the following rates on con-
sumer loans:  
Interest in excess of that 
permitted by law is re-
coverable and, when 
such charges are willful, 
twice the amount of such 
interest paid is recovera-
ble along with the excess 
 
 206.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1 (LexisNexis 1953). 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(a) (2015). 
 209.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(b)(1) (2015). 
 210.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(b)(2) (2015). 
 211.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(b)(3) (2015). 
 212.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(b)(4) (2015) (applicable to “motor vehicles, mobile homes, travel trail-
ers, aircraft, watercraft and farm equipment”). 
 213.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(b)(5) (2015). 
 214.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(b)(7) (2015). 
 215.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 41a(b)(9) (2015). 
 216.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 50(b) (2015). 
 217.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IX, § 50(a) (2015). 
 218.  VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-303(A) (2015). 
 219.  VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-309 (2015). 
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36 percent for payday loans [in addi-
tion with a fee of up to 20 percent]
222
  
Motor vehicle title loans: 




18 percent per month for amounts 
above $700 up to $1,400;
224
 




No limit on loans to entities.
226
 




 If usurious 
interest has not been 
paid, a borrower may 
plead usury as a defense 
to an action on the con-
tract and if proven, judg-
ment will be entered 
only for the principal 
sum, will all interest for-
feit by the lender.
228
.  
Washington 12 percent or four percentage points 
above the Federal Reserve System 
published rate for twenty-six week 
treasury bills, whichever is higher.
229
 
No limit for loans to profit and non-
profit corporations, Massachusetts 
trusts, associations, trusts, general 
partnerships, joint ventures, limited 
partnerships, and governments and 




No limit for loans primarily for agri-





All interest is forfeit and 
creditors may only re-
cover the principal 




 If interest has 
been paid, the creditor is 
entitled to a return only 
of the principal amount 
of the loan minus twice 










No limit on the interest that can be 
charged on loans in excess of $2,500 
Interest above the legal 
rate paid is recoverable 
within one year of pay-




 220.  VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1520(A)(1) (2015). 
 221.  VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1520(A)(2) (2015). 
 222.  VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1817(A) (2015). An additional loan fee of 20 percent of the amount advanced 
can be also be imposed as well as a $5 loan verification fee under § 6.2-1817(B)-(C) of the Virginia Code. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 6.2-1817(B)-(C) (2015). 
 223.  VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-2216(A)(1) (2015). 
 224.  VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-2216(A)(2) (2015). 
 225.  VA. CODE ANN.. § 6.2-2216(A)(3) (2015). 
 226.  VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-308 (2015). 
 227.  VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-305 (2015). 
 228.  VA. CODE ANN.. § 6.2-304 (2015). 
 229.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.020(1) (West 2015). 
 230.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.080 (West 2015). 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.52.030(1) (West 2015). 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3301(a) (2015). 
 241.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3304 (2015). 
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that are not secured by a mortgage on 
real property or a cooperative apart-
ment lease that are the primary resi-
dence of the borrower if any of the fol-
lowing conditions are satisfied:
235
 




· The borrower is an individual, group 
of individuals, corporation, unincor-
porated association, partnership, or 
other entity, and the loan is made for 
the purpose of acquiring or carrying 
on a business, professional, or com-
mercial activity;
237
 the borrower is 
an individual, a group of individuals, 
corporation, unincorporated associa-
tion, partnership, or any other entity, 
and the loan is made for the purpose 
of acquiring any real or personal 
property as an investment or for car-
rying on an investment activity;
238
 
· The borrower is a religious society, 
formed under, or subject to, Chapter 
4 of Title 29, and the loan is made for 
the purpose of acquiring or making 
an improvement on any real or per-
sonal property for purposes other 




The Council of the District of Colum-
bia is authorized to provide by ex-
emptions to the maximum rates of in-
terest allowable and to change the 





West Virginia Generally 6 percent on oral con-
tracts
242
 and  
8 percent on written contracts.
243
 
All interest is forfeit.
245
 
In addition, the borrower 
may recover from the 
original lender or any 
holder other than a 
holder in due course the 
 
 235.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3301(d)(1) (2015). 
 236.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3301(d)(1)(A) (2015). 
 237.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3301(d)(1)(B) (2015). 
 238.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3301(d)(1)(C) (2015). 
 239.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3301(d)(1)(D) (2015). 
 240.  D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3309 (2015). 
 242.  W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-6-5(a) (West 2015). 
 243.  W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-6-5(b) (West 2015). 
 245.  W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-6-6 (West 2015). 
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9 percent on written contracts involv-








greater of $100 or four 
times the amount of in-
terest agreed to be paid 











No limit for loans in excess of 
$150,000 that are not secured by a 
mortgage on a one to four family 




Principal amount in ex-
cess of $2,000 is recov-




usurious interest has 
been paid, all interest 
paid may be recovered 




Wyoming For consumer credit sales other than 
revolving credit in the amount of 
$75,000 or less: 
36 percent on the first $1,000 and 21 
percent on amounts above $1,000.
252
 




For consumer revolving credit sales: 
1.75 percent per month.
254
 




No limit for non-consumer loans.
256
 
Excess interest above 





Even a cursory perusal of Table 1 makes it abundantly clear that there is little 
consistency in the regulation of interest rates or the civil consequences of usury at the 
state level. States protect classes of borrowers from interest rates deemed unreason-
ably high as they see fit, with some providing strong protection for borrowers with 
low interest rate caps and significant civil penalties, while others protect lenders (and 
the right of individuals to contract freely) through eschewing the regulation of usury 
altogether, by setting high rate caps, by exempting certain classes of borrowers from 
rate caps, and by failing to impose any significant civil penalty as a disincentive to 
 
 244.  W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-6-5(c) (West 2015). 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 138.05(1)(a) (West 2015). 
 248.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 138.05(5) (West 2015). 
 249.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 138.05(7) (West 2015). 
 250.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 138.06(1) (West 2015). 
 251.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 138.06(3) (West 2015). 
 252.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-212(b)(i)(A)-(B) (1977). 
 253.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-212(b)(ii) (1977). 
 254.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-218(c)(i) (1977). 
 255.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-310(a) (1977). 
 256.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-260 (1977). 
 257.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-521(c) (1977). 
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violate rate caps when these exist. Thus Nevada and Utah impose no maximum cap 
on interest rates, with Idaho, New Hampshire and South Dakota permitting any rate 
of interest to be charged as long as there is a written contract. A number of states, 
including Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming, ex-
empt either business entities and/or business loans from interest rate caps applicable 
to other borrowers in these states. In some states, interest caps are inapplicable if a 
loan amount exceeds a specific dollar amount, such as $100,000 (and not secured by 
a mortgage) in Delaware, $500,000 in Florida, $15,000 in Kentucky, $100,000 in 
Minnesota, $250,000 in New York (other than loans secured by a mortgage for one 
and two family homes, and any loan with a value of more than $2,500,000), $25,000 
(for fixed-rate loans) in North Carolina, $100,000 in Ohio, $35,000 in Pennsylvania 
for unsecured loans ($50,000 for any loan), $1,000,000 in Rhode Island for commer-
cial loans (except those secured by a home mortgage), $150,000 in Wisconsin (for 
loans not secured by a mortgage on a 1-4 family dwelling), and $75,000 in Wyoming. 
Some states have relatively low caps, such as Alabama (generally 6-8 percent), Cal-
ifornia (7-10 percent), and West Virginia (6-9 percent), while others have relatively 
high caps, such as Colorado’s 45 percent. 
The civil consequences of entering into a usurious contract also vary widely from 
state to state as illustrated in Table 1. Among the states, Connecticut provides the 
harshest civil penalty making the creditor forfeit all interest as well as the principal 
amount of the loan. Twenty-three states and Washington D.C. provide for a forfeiture 
of the entire interest in an usurious contract: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California 
(treble the amount of interest actually paid is recoverable), Delaware, Florida, Geor-
gia, Hawaii, Illinois (twice the entire interest is recoverable), Iowa, Kentucky, Loui-
siana, Massachusetts (but only in consumer retail agreements), Michigan, Montana 
(forfeiture of double the amount of interest), Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota 
(25 percent of principal is also forfeit), Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont (half of the 
principal is also forfeit), Washington, Washington D.C., and Wisconsin. Sixteen 
states allow for the forfeiture of the excess interest above the legal rate: Colorado, 
Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland (the lesser of three times the amount 
above the maximum rate of interest or $500 is recoverable), Minnesota, Missouri 
(twice the amount of interest paid above the legal rate is recoverable), New Mexico, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee (permits excess interest above legal 
rate actually paid to be offset as a defense in an action to collect on the debt), Texas 
(allows for the recovery of three times the amount of interest above the legal rate or, 
in the alternative, the lesser of 20 percent of the principal or $2,000), Virginia (also 
allows for the recovery or twice the amount of interest above the permissible rate, 
court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees for willful usury), and Wyoming. The re-
maining states either treat usurious contracts as void or do not make specific provi-
sions as to a remedy in their statutory framework. If a state’s statutory framework 
declares usurious contracts void, then generally no recovery may be sought in court 
by the creditor.258  
 
 258.  See, e.g., 44B AM. JUR. 2d Interest and Usury § 217 (2015). 
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III. FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON USURY 
The federal government has never imposed a general restriction on usury in the 
United States, leaving it up to the states to regulate the matter as they see fit. With 
the exception of loans to active duty military personnel and their dependents for 
whom a maximum interest rate of 36 percent is imposed by federal law,259 Congress 
has been more concerned with mandating transparency as to the cost of credit trans-
actions than with regulating interest rates or fees as such. The Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA),260 for example, requires lenders to provide to consumers detailed infor-
mation about the cost of credit that includes not only interest, points, and related 
charges261 but also service or carrying charges,262 any loan fee or finder’s fee,263 fees 
for investigation or credit reports,264 credit insurance fees,265 broker fees charged to 
the borrower,266 and insurance premiums included in the finance charge.267 Thus the 
emphasis is on providing credit to consumers with full disclosure rather than on pro-
tecting consumers from unfair or even unreasonable credit terms (with the noted ex-
ception of active duty personnel and their covered dependents.) Nevertheless, federal 
law does indirectly impact state usury laws in ways that undermine or negate state 
efforts to protect their citizens against usurious contracts.  
A. Nationally Chartered Banks are not Bound by State Usury Laws 
The National Bank Act allows nationally chartered banks to charge “interest at 
the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is 
located, or at a rate of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day 
commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district 
where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater.”268 Thus a nationally char-
tered bank located in Nevada, for example, where there is no maximum interest rate 
under state law may charge any interest not only in Nevada but also in loans made in 
any other state, regardless of the local state usury laws. Banks and other financial 
institutions chartered under state law are restricted by the usury laws of every state 
in which they do business, but not federally chartered banks as the U.S. Supreme 
Court made clear in Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp.269 In Mar-
quette, a Minnesota-chartered national banking association brought suit to enjoin the 
operation of a federally chartered Nebraska bank’s credit card program in Minnesota 
until such time as it complied with Minnesota usury laws. The trial court permanently 
enjoined the Nebraska bank’s subsidiary from issuing credit cards in Minnesota. The 
 
 259.  See Section I, supra and notes 13-15. 
 260.  15 U.S.C. § 1605 (2015). 
 261.  15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2015). 
 262.  15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2015). 
 263.  15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2015). 
 264.  15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) (2015). 
 265.  15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2015). 
 266.  15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2015). 
 267.  15 U.S.C. § 1605(b)-(c) (2015). 
 268.  12 U.S.C. § 85 (2015). 
 269.  439 U.S. 299 (1978). 
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Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the National Bank Act permitted the 
Nebraska bank to charge its Minnesota credit card customers any interest rate sanc-
tioned by Nebraska law. On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. “Section 85 
thus plainly provides that a national bank may charge interest ‘on any loan’ at the 
rate allowed by the laws of the State in which the bank is “located,”270 wrote Justice 
Brennan, and then concluded that a nationally chartered bank is “‘located’ for pur-
poses of the section in the State named in its organization certificate.”271 Under cur-
rent law, a bank can sidestep the usury laws of every state simply by obtaining a 
federal charter in a state that has no caps on interest charges.  
 
B. Special Protection for Military Personnel 
As previously noted, federal law (commonly referred to as the Military Lending 
Act) protects active duty military personnel and their dependents from predatory 
loans by capping the maximum interest rate for these loans at 36 percent.272 In addi-
tion, as of October 13, 2010, loans incurred by military service members individually 
or jointly with their spouses prior to entering military service are capped at six per-
cent.273 Interest above six percent is forgiven274 for the period of the debtor’s military 
service and for a year thereafter.275 Creditors can ask a court for protection from the 
interest reduction if they can convince a judge that the debtor’s ability to repay a loan 
at the original interest rate is not affected by the debtor’s military service.276 Military 
reservists called to active duty are also provided relief from certain agricultural loans 
by having interest forgiven and principal payments deferred during the period of ac-
tive duty.277 Thus Congress has provided significant protection for active duty mili-
tary personnel against predatory loans and has decreed that lenders provide tempo-
rary interest-free or low-interest loans under certain circumstances for active duty 
military personnel. No such protection is offered, however, to the general public. To 
the contrary, since nationally chartered banks can sidestep all state usury statutes by 
organizing in a state that places no restriction on interest rates, at least as regards 
federally chartered lenders, the federal government in effect preempts and nullifies 
states’ efforts to restrict unreasonably high interest rates or predatory lending prac-
tices that they deem violate the stated public policy of the state to the detriment of 
their citizens.  
C. Tribal Immunity from State Usury Statutes 
Indian tribes in the United States enjoy sovereign immunity that is subject to 
Congressional limitation. Justice Kagan writing for the majority of a split United 
 
 270.  Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 308 (1978). 
 271.  Id. at 310. 
 272.  See Section I, supra and notes 13-16. 
 273.  50 U.S.C.A. App. § 527(a)(1) (West 2015). 
 274.  50 U.S.C.A. App. § 527(a)(2) (West 2015). 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  50 U.S.C.A. App. § 527(c) (West 2015). 
 277.  7 U.S.C.A. § 1982 (West 2015). 
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States Supreme Court recently noted:  
As “‘domestic dependent nations,’” Indian tribes exercise “inherent sov-
ereign authority” that is subject to plenary control by Congress. Unless and 
“until Congress acts, the tribes retain” their historic sovereign authority. 
Among the core aspects of sovereignty that tribes possess—subject to con-
gressional action—is the “common-law immunity from suit traditionally 
enjoyed by sovereign powers.” That immunity applies whether a suit is 
brought by a State, or arises from a tribe’s commercial activities off Indian 
lands.278 
In recent years, lenders aligned with Indian tribes across the country have suc-
cessfully used tribal immunity in many states to defeat usury laws.279  Despite criti-
cism from consumer advocates and industry groups, as well as the mostly unsuccess-
ful efforts of state attorneys general to enforce regulations, tribal-affiliated lenders 
operate with relative impunity.280 Tribal sovereign immunity bars all suits against 
Indian tribes except for the limited circumstances where the tribe itself waives im-
munity or Congress clearly and expressly abrogates such immunity.281 The U. S. Su-
preme Court in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.282 made it 
clear that both the governmental and commercial activities of a tribe and on and 
off-reservation activities can be covered by tribal immunity.283 To date, state actions, 
class action cases, and federal agency actions have yielded mixed results. Most agree 
that federally recognized sovereign tribes have the authority to engage in internet 
lending to state residents without those tribes being subjected to state authority. How-
ever, the extent to which tribal sovereign immunity shields service providers that 
assist tribes engaging in credit transactions outside of tribal land is by no means set-
tled.284 Whether non-tribal lenders who become affiliated with a tribe in what is often 
referred to as a “rent a tribe” arrangement in order to cloak themselves with tribal 
sovereign immunity and offer high-interest, high-fee loans outside of tribal lands 
through the Internet, through brick and mortar payday loan storefronts and through 
similar arrangements. 285 Typically these lenders reorganize an existing company un-
der a tribal name, pay the tribe a fee, and operate their business from call centers or 
locations outside of tribal lands.286 Tribal immunity for loans made outside of tribal 
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lands, however, is not always applied as a matter of course. In Otoe–Missouria Tribe 
of Indians v. New York State Department of Financial Services,287 federally recog-
nized Indian tribes in Oklahoma and Michigan brought action for a preliminary in-
junction preventing New York from banning the high-interest, short-term consumer 
loans they offered over the Internet, some of which exceeded a 1,000 percent annual 
interest rate288. The District Court for the Southern District of New York denied 
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction289, and plaintiff appealed. The Court 
of Appeals held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the likelihood of success on the merits because the 
Court’s conclusions that the loans did not occur on Native American soil was reason-
able. Whether the U.S. Supreme Court would reach the same conclusion is unclear. 
But for the moment, at least, New York’s right to protect its citizens from internet-
based loans from Native American tribes that solicit New Yorkers outside of their 
sovereign tribal territory is upheld.  
 On the whole, however, efforts of state attorneys general to enforce regulations 
have been largely unsuccessful and tribal-affiliated payday lenders operate with rel-
ative impunity with the practice of lenders affiliating with tribes becoming more com-
mon.290  In California and Colorado, courts have determined that lenders who are an 
arm of the tribe are not subject to state’s usury laws.291 As of this writing, the Su-
preme Court of California has agreed to hear an appeal from the California Court of 
Appeals decision dismissing five claims against tribal lenders on grounds of tribal 
immunity in People v. Miami Nation Enterprises.292 Overall, it is abundantly clear 
that state regulators face extreme difficulty in actions to enforce usury laws against 
tribal lenders when such companies move to dismiss such actions for lack of juris-
diction based on tribal immunity.293  
IV. FEDERAL LAW UNDERMINES STATE USURY STATUTES 
The preemption of state usury statutes under federal law for federally chartered 
lenders and lenders affiliated with Native American tribes294 have provided lenders 
with useful tools for avoiding usury restrictions at the state level.  To date, Congress 
has only seen fit to protect military personnel and their families through the Military 
Lending Act against predatory lenders.295 For the rest of Americans, only states cur-
rently offer protection against unreasonably high interest rates and credit fees. As 
previously discussed296 and as is clearly evidenced in Table 1, most states have taken 
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steps to protect consumers from unreasonably high interest rates. Nevertheless, lend-
ers that provide consumer loans in violation of state usury laws have thrived by man-
aging to sidestep state regulations through the loopholes provided in federal law dis-
cussed in Part II supra. But even when federal law does not preempt state usury 
statutes, lenders can also exploit loopholes in state laws to circumvent state usury 
statutes.297  
V. PAYDAY LENDERS 
No type of loan today poses a greater challenge for states who want to impose 
rate caps on consumer borrowing than payday loans.298 Nor is any other type of loan 
shrouded in so much controversy due largely to three factors: 1. the extremely high 
effective interest rates that these loans impose on consumers;299 2. the vulnerable 
nature of the target consumer for these loans;300 and 3. the business model that inten-
tionally seeks to trap consumers with very limited resources into a cycle of borrowing 
from which they have great difficulty in extricating themselves.301   
Payday loans are short-term loans that carry extremely high interest rates offered 
to consumers with a pressing need for cash.302 As an example, a consumer with over-
due utility bills whose next paycheck is two weeks away goes to a payday lender who 
provides a $300 loan due in two weeks and charges a $90 interest fee for an effective 
annual interest rate of 780 percent.303 Two weeks later, when the loan is due, the 
consumer is unable to repay it, and the lender renews the loan, with the cycle repeat-
ing itself throughout the next year, at the end of which the consumer has paid $1,800 
in interest and still owes the entire original $300 principal.304  
Payday loans are loans intended to tide a consumer over to their next paycheck 
when the need for cash arises and can be described as “small, short-term, triple-digit 
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interest rate loan, typically in the range of $200 to $500 dollars, secured by the con-
sumer’s post-dated check or debit authorization.”305 This gives payday lenders sig-
nificant leverage over borrowers beyond that enjoyed by other lenders since borrow-
ers know that the full amount of the loan will be automatically deducted from their 
checking account through an electronic transfer (or a post-dated check deposited by 
the lender on the loan’s due date) triggering bank overdraft or bounced check fees. 
In addition, bad check statutes in many states allow a payday lender to sue for treble 
damages rather than just the cost of the loan and other associated collection costs.306 
And writing a bad check when one knows there are insufficient funds to cover it can 
also subject the drawer to criminal prosecution.307 This provides payday lenders with 
a competitive advantage over other lenders that allows them to use threats of both 
civil and criminal prosecutions as a means of ensuring collection.308 It also provides 
leverage to coerce borrowers to extend their loans for another term when they are 
unable to pay the full amount of the loan to avoid civil and criminal penalties, as well 
as bank fees for bounced checks. And it helps payday lenders to trap consumers into 
a cycle of debt that extends far beyond the original short-term of the loan. According 
to the Center for Responsible Lending, 90 percent of the revenue for payday loan 
businesses is generated by borrowers who cannot pay off their loans when due, and 
the typical payday borrower pays $793 for a $325 loan.309  
Payday lenders essentially apply the same business model as loan sharks, namely 
providing loans of typically relatively small amounts for short periods of time at very 
high interest rates intended to trap the consumer into a cycle of borrowing.310 For 
both payday lenders and criminal loan sharks, the intent is to keep lenders paying 
interest only on these loans while rolling over the full principal amount as many times 
as possible.311 And loan sharks who form part of a criminal enterprise in Las Vegas 
have traditionally charged lower interest rates at five percent per week than their 
counterparts making legal payday loans.312 Both those who defend and those who 
attack the payday loan industry agree on the importance of repeat customers for pay-
day lenders, and some lenders offer incentives and loyalty programs to encourage 
borrowers to become repeat customers.313  
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VI. THE NEED TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM PREDATORY LENDERS 
There is no doubt that loans that carry extraordinarily high effective rates of in-
terest will remain controversial. It is reasonable to expect that fringe lenders who 
issue loans without regard to the credit worthiness of their clients will charge a high 
rate of interest in order to defray the high risk of default.314 But for these high interest 
rates, there might be no other recourse for borrowers of limited means in need of fast 
cash in an emergency situation. Reasonable people may differ on whether the high 
cost of payday loans and similar fringe credit market products are attributable to the 
higher risk of making such loans to sub-prime consumers or to the unbridled greed 
of lenders who offer a product at the highest cost that the market will bear. Fringe 
banking is certainly a profitable business that has grown from nearly nothing to a 
$100 billion dollar industry over a period of two decades with more check cashing 
and payday businesses in the U.S. today than McDonald’s, Burger King, Target, 
Sears, JCPenney, and Wal-Mart locations combined.315  
There is some disturbing evidence that fringe credit market lenders such as pay-
day lenders unfairly target communities of color with predatory loans that have a 
disparate impact on these communities.316 There is also evidence of a disparate im-
pact on women317 and on the elderly.318 The empirical evidence as to the impact of 
payday loans is inconclusive, but many local governments are convinced that payday 
lenders do more harm than good in their communities.319 As a result, many munici-
palities have adopted moratoria on the development of new payday businesses and 
imposed land used restrictions on where payday lenders may locate in an attempt to 
stem the proliferation of these businesses.320 But under current federal law, both 
states and local municipalities are powerless to control the interest charged by payday 
lenders who are affiliated with nationally chartered banks or Native-American tribes, 
even when that affiliation is tenuous at best as in the rent-a-tribe and rent-a-bank 
schemes.321 
One might argue that if predatory loans are being offered to consumers at exor-
bitant rates through unfair marketing practices relief could always be found at the 
local small claims court under a claim to set aside loan agreements as unconscionable. 
But this option is also denied consumers by loan agreements that require binding 
arbitration and prevent consumers having their case heard in a court of law.322 Class 
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action waivers are also often contained in these agreements.323  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Throughout our history, the states protected their citizens against unreasonably 
high interest rates through usury statutes.324 Most states today attempt to protect their 
citizens through usury statutes that define the outer limits of what state legislatures 
find to be reasonable interest rates and fees that may be exacted by lenders.325 These 
statutes reflect the diversity one finds among the states, and a judgment made by the 
governing authorities under their plenary police powers of what is in the best interest 
of their citizens. There is no question that the federal government could regulate the 
payday loan industry or impose a general maximum interest rate cap, and some com-
mentators have called for Congress to do just that.326  
Payday lenders and other sub-prime lenders will continue to use the loopholes 
provided by federal law to flaunt state usury statutes until Congress addresses the 
issue. Given that it is federal law and federal preemption that have severely limited 
the ability of states to effectively protect their citizens from predatory loans, it is not 
unreasonable to call on Congress to provide a solution. One possible obvious solution 
is for Congress to extent the same protection to all American consumers that it did to 
military personnel and their families by imposing a maximum interest rate of 36 per-
cent on all consumer loans.327 This is perhaps the easiest solution, though it would 
create other serious issues, including imposing a federal interest rate cap on states 
that do not currently place a cap on interest rates, or have higher caps than Congress 
might impose. At the very least, Congress should address the most egregious prob-
lems caused by lenders in the sub-prime credit markets that include payday loans. It 
could impose the same 36 percent cap currently applicable to loans to military per-
sonnel at least to all consumer loans below a certain dollar threshold (e.g., $1,000). 
It would also need to specifically make the interest cap applicable to lenders owned 
by or chartered by Native American tribes to borrowers outside of tribal lands to close 
that particular loophole.   
A national poll of likely 2016 voters conducted in January 2015 shows very 
strong support for caps on payday loans among Democrat, Republican and Independ-
ent voters.328 Among those polled, 61 percent of Democrats, 62 percent of Republi-
cans and 58 percent of Independents had an unfavorable or very unfavorable view of 
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payday lenders.329 79 percent of Democrats, 75 percent of Republicans and 77 per-
cent of Independents supported or strongly supported imposing rate caps on payday 
lenders.330 The electorate is clearly united in its support for rate caps, at least on pay-
day loans. At a time in our history when even the most casual of observers cannot 
fail to notice a lack of bipartisanship in Congress and a concomitant lack of cooper-
ation between the legislative and executive branches, it would seem that an issue that 
appears to have overwhelming support from Democrat, Republican and Independent 
voters should merit serious attention. It could provide a salutary opportunity for the 
legislative and executive branches of government to work together to resolve a prob-
lem that the vast majority of the electorate across party affiliations seems to think 
should be resolved. Political expediency aside, Congress should address the current 
undermining of state usury statutes by federal law and promote the ends of justice by 
protecting everyone everywhere in the United States from predatory loans just as it 
has our men and women in uniform and their families. 
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